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S ecurities law in the United States ("U.S.") is found pri-
marily in the federal securities laws as administered by
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and inter-
preted by the federal courts. The federal securities laws were
preceded by state securities laws administered by state securi-
ties commissions and stock exchange self-regulatory law. Al-
though some key aspects of state securities regulation have
been preempted by federal statutes, other aspects remain in-
tact. Litigation in the state courts, by private parties or public
prosecutors, sometimes creates securities law. Furthermore,
corporation law is primarily state law, even though it is some-
times overridden by the federal securities laws. Self-regulatory
organizations ("SROs") continue to adopt and administer securi-
ties market law under the SEC's oversight, as well as to admin-
ister securities arbitration facilities. In addition to competing
with the federal and state courts and with state and SRO agen-
cies as lawmakers, the SEC also competes with other federal
financial regulators, in particular with the Commodities Fu-
tures Trading Commission, the Federal Reserve Board and the
Department of the Treasury, with regard to the parameters of
its jurisdiction to regulate securities products and the securities
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industry. In times of market stress, when investors are dis-
gruntled, some of the fault lines in the competition among secu-
rities regulators and lawmakers become more apparent.
Europe is struggling with similar problems in reconciling fed-
eral and state law and regulation concerning the capital mar-
kets and public companies. Although a series of securities laws,
directives, and the adoption of a single European currency have
helped to integrate European capital markets, they remain
fragmented to a large extent. European Union ("EU") directives
are not self-operating and must be translated into national leg-
islation in every EU member state, a slow and cumbersome
process. An ambitious Financial Services Action Plan adopted
in May 1999 will require the amendment of some directives and
the adoption of new directives by 2005. Although the EU does
not have a federal securities commission, two new European
Securities Committees have been established to facilitate the
realization of the Financial Services Action Plan. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice also creates securities law at the federal
level. Although securities law and corporation law remain pri-
marily national, much new securities law is derived from EU
directives. Every EU member state now has a government se-
curities commission, but the United Kingdom ("U.K.") has con-
solidated regulation via the Financial Services Authority
("FSA") and other countries are considering this model. In
some countries in Europe there continues to be self-regulation
by SROs, but as a general matter SRO regulation has been
transferred to government securities commissions.
Some scholars believe that competition among financial regu-
lators is beneficial and results in an optimum level of regulatory
intrusion upon private business interests. Proponents of this
theory frequently are apologists for deregulation. This author
is considerably more skeptical of regulatory competition be-
cause it frequently undermines the rule of law. Nevertheless,
some competition between federal and state regulators is deeply
rooted in constitutional federalism. In both the U.S. and the
EU the burden is on the proponents of federal regulation to jus-
tify its necessity. This Article will attempt to describe the divi-
sion between federal and state securities regulation in the U.S.
and the EU, suggest that the causes of regulatory competition
are historical and political, and explore whether there are prin-
cipled justifications for allocating regulatory responsibilities
among federal, state and SRO interests. In addition, this Arti-
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cle will inquire as to how competing regulatory interests should
be reconciled.
In general, as the securities markets in the U.S. became more
national and securities firms matured, federal securities laws
came to trump state laws. Similarly, in Europe, a determina-
tion to integrate the capital markets of EU member states led to
the need for securities regulation at the EU level. Yet, local or
state interests, as well as political beliefs have countered this
trend toward centralizing securities law. This tension is very
well illustrated in the area of takeover law.
Part II of this Article will outline the framework and histori-
cal development of securities law in the U. S., and the long term
trend toward federal preemption. Part III will outline the
framework and historical development of securities law in the
EU. Part IV of this Article will discuss the tension between fed-
eral and state interests in takeover law in both the U.S. and
Europe, as an example of an effort to reconcile competing regu-
latory goals. The Article will then discuss, in Part V, the views
of the proponents of regulatory competition and the author's
reservations about these theories. It will suggest that the fun-
damental purpose of securities regulation, which is the promo-
tion of investor confidence, should be the guiding principle in
allocating regulatory responsibilities between federal, state and
SRO lawmakers, and administrators.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERALISM IN U.S. SECURITIES
REGULATION
A. Constitutionality of Blue-Sky Laws and SRO Regulation
State corporation law, stock exchange listing requirements
and market rules, and state securities regulation (or "blue-sky"
laws) preceded federal securities regulation. This tripartite
regulatory system was recognized when the first federal securi-
ties law, the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act")1 was
passed and when the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Ex-
change Act")2 was adopted the following year creating the SEC.
The federal-state-SRO system of securities regulation involved
conflicting philosophies and considerable overlap and duplica-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
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tion. As a general matter, the federal laws covering the flota-
tion of public offerings were based on a full disclosure philoso-
phy, whereas much of the state system was merit based, allow-
ing a blue-sky commissioner to judge whether an issuer's capi-
tal structure was fair, just and equitable.
There was not a well articulated allocation of obligations and
priorities, and it was not clear that Congress "had any system-
atic understanding of what the relations of state and federal
securities regulations should be, how regulatory responsibilities
should be allocated, or how federal disclosure regulation and
state merit regulation should be accommodated to each other."
SRO regulation, by contrast, set forth merit-based listing and
offering standards for public companies,4 just and equitable
principles of conduct for member firms and associated persons,'
and regulated trading markets and access fees for using those
markets.! The SEC's authority with respect to altering stock
exchange listing standards is unclear,7 but since 1975 its over-
sight authority with respect to other SRO rules is fairly well
established.8 On the other hand, SROs are not considered gov-
3. Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offer-
ings, 41 Bus. LAw. 785, 793 (1986).
4. See A.B.A., Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAw. 1489, 1510-14 (2002) [hereinafter ABA,
Market Structure Report]. See also Rule 2710 (Corporate Financing Rule -
Underwriting Terms and Arrangements), N.A.S.D. Sec. Dealers Manual
(CCH), at 4501-16 (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter N.A.S.D. Manual].
5. See Business Conduct Rules 2100 (General Standards), 2300 (Transac-
tions with Customers), 2400 (Commissions, Mark-Ups and Charges), N.A.S.D.
Manual, at 4111-41, 4261-81.
6. Until 1975 the New York Stock Exchange enforced a fixed minimum
commission schedule on its member firms. Although fixed commissions were
abolished in 1975, see Rule 19b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (2002), SROs continue
to levy other fees, for example, with respect to trading data, subject to SEC
oversight, see U.S. SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMM. ON MARKET INFO. (2001), at www.sec.gov/divisionsl
marketreg/marketinfo/finalreport.htm. The NASD continues to have a ban
against granting a selling concession or discount in a fixed price offering to a
non-broker-dealer. See Conduct Rule 2740 (Selling Concessions, Discounts
and Other Allowances), N.A.S.D. Manual, at 4534. The NYSE and Nasdaq
have numerous market conduct rules.
7. See ABA, Market Structure Report, supra note 4, at 1516-20.
8. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 6(a), 15(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(a),
78o(a) (2000). When the Exchange Act was passed in 1934 the SEC had over-
sight only of stock exchanges, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 48
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ernment agencies, although they exercise delegated governmen-
tal authority.'
Federal preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause
is not a politically popular mode of legislation. Nevertheless,
Congress has frequently preempted state law, particularly in
the area of financial regulation. Preemption may be express,
implied, or by reason of conflict. Preemption is express when
there is an explicit statutory command that state law be dis-
placed." A clear example of express preemption in financial
regulation is in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA"), which states that the provisions of that act
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
Stat. 881, 892, and broker dealers, see id. § 15, 48 Stat. at 895-96. The NASD
was organized after a 1938 amendment adding section 15A of the Exchange
Act. Over-the-Counter Market Act, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1 (2000)). In 1964, the SEC was given jurisdic-
tion over persons associated with broker-dealers and non-listed issuers. See
Act of Aug. 20, 1964, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)
(2000)). In 1975, the SEC gained further oversight over exchanges and other
market participants. See Act of June 4, 1975, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, q-ls(b)(c) (2000)).
9. "Mere approval" of a private regulation by a government agency does
not necessarily constitute state action. Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1466-68 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Whether state
action exists depends upon whether there is a sufficient "nexus" between the
State and the action that is being challenged. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 1004-05 (1982). Courts have rather consistently held that
SROs are not state actors for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Desiderio v. Nat'l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d
198, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1999); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1975);
Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 134, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). But
see Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. Amer. Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.
1971) (holding that the American Stock Exchange is a governmental agency,
due to its "intimate involvement" with the SEC); Villani v. New York Stock
Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that Fifth
Amendment due process requirements apply to disciplinary hearings of NYSE
because "[sluch hearings are conducted under the self-regulatory power con-
ferred upon it by... the [SEC]"). See also Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341, 366 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
Clon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See also Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Just a Private Club: Self-
Regulatory Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 453, 483-84 (1995).
10. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 382 (1992).
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or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... "" Preemp-
tion is implied and state law is therefore displaced "if federal
law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reason-
able the inference that Congress left no room for the states to
supplement it."'2 This type of implied preemption is often re-
ferred to as field preemption. State law may be displaced under
a conflict analysis if either it is impossible to comply with both a
state and a federal law, or if the state law "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."'" An example of conflict preemption
in securities law is Edgar v. Mite Corp., where an Illinois take-
over statute was found to conflict with the Exchange Act. " In
all cases involving preemption, the courts look to the intent of
Congress, which frequently is unclear due to the political sensi-
tivities involved.
When the Securities Act and the Exchange Act were initially
passed, Congress did not explicitly preempt state law. To the
contrary, Congress inserted "savings clauses" in both the Secu-
rities Act and the Exchange Act." Former Section 18 of the Se-
curities Act provided: "Nothing in this Subchapter shall affect
the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or
office performing like functions) of any State or Territory of the
United States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2002).
12. Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). See also
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 95-99 (1983) (finding that state laws
having a connection with or reference to employee benefit plans are pre-
empted by ERISA, with which Congress intended to preempt an entire field);
Patenaude v. Equitable Life Ins., 290 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A]
statute may so completely preempt state law that it occupies the entire field,
barring assertion of any state law claims and permitting removal to federal
court."). In Patenaude the court held that a deferred tax variable annuity
purchased by the plaintiff fell within the meaning of "covered security" under
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"), and therefore
plaintiffs state law claims were appropriately discarded by the district court.
See generally id. The Court stated: "Congress has consistently indicated its
intent, particularly with the passage of SLUSA, to displace state regulation
insofar as it relates to the marketing of the securities component of variable
annuities." Id. at 1027.
13. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
14. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
15. See infra notes 16-20.
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any person." The legislative history of this provision is sparse.
However, the initial Securities Act bill, which passed the House,
set forth a clause prohibiting the sale of securities in interstate
commerce into any state if such sale would have violated the
blue-sky laws of that state.17 The stated purpose of this prohibi-
tion was "to assure the states that the [Securities Act] was not
an attempt to supplant their laws, but an attempt to supple-
ment their laws and to assist them in enforcing their laws in
those cases where they have no control."8 This clause was later
deleted by Senate amendment.'9 Former Section 28(a) of the
Exchange Act was similar to former Section 18 of the Securities
Act. It provided: "nothing in this chapter shall affect the juris-
diction of the securities commission (or any agency or officer
performing like functions) of any State over any security or any
person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."
°2
Although these "savings clauses" indicated a congressional
intent not to preempt state blue-sky law generally,' the Su-
preme Court could nevertheless have declared that some or all
state securities laws were preempted under field or conflict pre-
emption principles. In addition to being invalidated due to fed-
eral preemption, state blue-sky legislation could have been de-
clared invalid under the Commerce Clause. Legislation will be
invalidated under the Commerce Clause if it imposes a burden
on interstate commerce that is excessive in relation to the local
interests served.2 In many instances, state blue-sky regula-
tions imposed burdens on interstate commerce. While such
burdens can be justified on the ground that a state has a legiti-
mate interest in capital investment or financial services within
16. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 18, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000)).
17. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 10-11, 25 (1933).
18. Federal Securities Act: Hearing before the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314, 73rd Cong. 117 (1933) (statement of Ollie M.
Butler, Foreign Service Div., Dept. of Commerce).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 73-152, at 27 (1933).
20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28, 48 Stat. 903 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2000)).
21. See Russell A. Smith, "Blue Sky" Laws and the Federal Securities Acts,
34 MicH. L. REv. 1135, 1160 (1936).
22. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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its borders, regulation that effectively impedes the interstate
capital markets would be invalid. 3
The constitutionality of state blue-sky laws was first tested in
three Supreme Court cases decided in 1917, sixteen years be-
fore the first federal securities law was enacted.' While a vari-
ety of constitutional arguments were raised in these cases, the
cases particularly focused upon the possible limitations imposed
by the Fourteenth Amendment on the power of a state to pre-
vent fraudulent securities issuances. Only one of the opinions,
however, specifically discussed the contention that the blue-sky
laws burdened interstate commerce. In Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., the Court upheld the blue-sky statute under review, on the
ground that the statute was only applicable to dispositions of
securities within the state and, thus, could not burden inter-
state commerce. 25 The Court found that:
Upon their transportation into the State there is no impedi-
ment - no regulation of them or interference with them after
they get there. There is the exaction only that he who dis-
poses of them there shall be licensed to do so, and this only
that they may not appear in false character and impose an ap-
pearance of a value which they may not possess - and this
certainly is only an indirect burden upon them as objects of in-
terstate commerce, if they may be regarded as such.2"
This reasoning clearly suggests that in-state corporations that
participate in purely local financing ventures are subject to
blue-sky merit regulation and that blue-sky merit regulation
limited to intrastate issuances is valid. It remained an open
23. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (holding that the
Alabama domestic preference tax statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (deeming uncon-
stitutional a Florida statute that prevented out-of-state bank holding compa-
nies from owning or controlling any business within the state that sold in-
vestment advisory services); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429
U.S. 318, 329, 329-32 (1977) (invalidating a section of the New York Tax Law
on Commerce Clause grounds, because law provided a "direct commercial
advantage to local business" by imposing a greater tax burden on out-of-state
securities transactions than on like in-state transactions).
24. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242
U.S. 568 (1917).
25. Hall, 242 U.S. at 539.
26. Id. at 557-58.
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question, however, whether this reasoning would insulate blue-
sky merit regulation that had the effect of compelling an out-of-
state corporation, which had registered an offering with the
SEC and made the full disclosure required by federal law, to
change its capitalization in order to syndicate a securities offer-
ing nationally.
In the period between 1977 and 1987 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed securities law federalism issues in the context of draw-
ing a line between state corporate law concerning the fiduciary
duties of managers and directors and federal securities law ob-
ligations placed on public companies and their officers and di-
rectors. From a political standpoint, the Court seemed con-
cerned with restricting the coverage of the federal securities
laws, especially in the corporate governance area. In view of
the Court's deference to congressional determination of the
scope of the commerce power since 1937, the Court did not rest
its rulings on constitutional grounds as much as on its construc-
tion of congressional intent in enacting the securities laws.
Nevertheless, these decisions should be viewed as part of the
Court's renewed interest in constitutional federalism as a
means to constrain the growth of federal power. 7
Beginning in the mid-1970s the Court articulated a distinc-
tion between state corporate law and the federal securities law
that has long been less than clear-cut.' In 1995, in a non-
securities law case, the Supreme Court stated: "Corporations
are creatures of state laws and investors commit their funds to
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of direc-
tors with respect to stock holders, state law will govern the in-
ternal affairs of the corporation." 9
27. See Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 431, 432-34 (2002); A. C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individ-
ual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78
WASH. U. L. Q. 435, 491, 494 (2000).
28. See Arthur Fleicher, Jr., Federalism and Corporation Law: An Assess-
ment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1179 (1965); Roberta S. Karmel, Qualitative
Standards for 'Qualified Securities": SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36
CATH. U. L. REV. 809 (1987); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate
Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 545 (1984).
29. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
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Thereafter, in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green," the Court ap-
plied this principle in a case arising under the federal securities
laws involving a short form merger. Under Delaware law own-
ers of at least 90% of a subsidiary's stock may merge with that
subsidiary without requesting the consent of minority share-
holders - who, in turn, must receive fair value for their
shares.3' The plaintiff, the minority shareholders in Santa Fe,
did not allege any material misrepresentation or omission."
Rather, they argued that the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws were applicable to a breach of corporate fiduci-
ary duty, because the majority shareholders were not pursuing
a legitimate corporate purpose." The Court, however, refused
to apply Rule 10b-5 to the allegations of "internal corporate
mismanagement."34 It stated: "Absent a clear indication of con-
gressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial
portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities; particularly where established state policies of
corporate regulation would be overridden." 5
In Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc.,"8 the Supreme Court indi-
cated that Santa Fe would not be confined to its facts, but
rather was a general holding concerning federalism. Schreiber
raised the issue of whether the withdrawal of a hostile tender
offer bid and the substitution of a partial bid, following negotia-
tions with the target company's management, constituted a
manipulative act under the Williams Act, an amendment to the
Exchange Act which regulates tender offers." The Court held
that the term "manipulation" in sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the
Exchange Act should be similarly interpreted and that manipu-
lative acts require misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
The conflict between state law and the Williams Act also was
presented to the Court in cases raising the issue of whether
30. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 253, 262 (2001).
32. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 479.
35. Id.
36. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
37. The Williams Act, which regulates tender offers, is contained in sec-
tions 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e)
(2002); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(f) (2002) and the regulations thereunder, 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 13e-101, 240.14a-1 to 14f-1.
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state statutes adopted to protect corporations against hostile
takeovers were unconstitutional. At about the same time as the
Williams Act was passed, a variety of state statutes sought to
control bids for "local" companies by subjecting such bids to ad-
ministrative delays and permitting a state securities commis-
sioner to determine the fairness of the bid. In the 1982 case of
Edgar v. MITE Corp. the Supreme Court held such a state se-
curities regulatory statute - the Illinois takeover law - incon-
sistent with the U.S. Constitution.38 There were six separate
opinions issued in this case, and a majority found only that the
state law imposed an indirect burden on interstate commerce."
A plurality of Justices found direct burdens on commerce,0 and
another plurality found preemption of the state law by the Wil-
liams Act.41 The Court explained that its traditional rationale
for upholding state blue-sky laws against commerce clause in-
validity "was that they only regulated transactions occurring
within the regulating States."" The Court stated, however, that
the Illinois regulatory scheme went beyond regulating intra-
state transactions. 3 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Amer-
ica,"" a subsequent case raising the issues of whether a state
control share statute was unconstitutional under the Suprem-
acy or Commerce Clauses, the Supreme Court upheld an Indi-
ana statute because: (1) it preserved the neutrality of the Wil-
liams Act; (2) left to shareholders the decision whether to accept
the offer; and (3) regulated internal corporate affairs.45
It is frequently stated that SROs exercise delegated govern-
mental authority. 6 In fact, stock exchange regulation preceded
38. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
39. Id. at 643-46.
40. Id. at 641-43.
41. Id. at 630-34.
42. Id. at 641 (citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917)).
43. Id.
44. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
45. See id. at 82, 83, 91, 94.
46. See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963) (describ-
ing the relationship between the New York Stock Exchange and the SEC as "a
type of partnership between government and private enterprise") (emphasis
added); Bruan, Gordon & Co. v. New York Stock Exchange, 502 F. Supp. 897,
903 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (describing the NASD as "an arm or agent" of the SEC);
Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. REv. 83, 154 (1996); Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Not
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the federal securities laws and SEC oversight was overlaid
upon an existing regulatory framework. The NASD was estab-
lished pursuant to an amendment to the Exchange Act and all
SEC registered broker-dealers are required to be NASD mem-
bers.47 Therefore, NASD regulation, in contrast to stock ex-
change regulation, can more appropriately be viewed as dele-
gated governmental regulatory authority. An important reason
for putting the SEC umbrella over SRO activity is that this
gives SROs qualified immunity from the antitrust laws.48
The relationship between the SEC and SROs raises some in-
teresting constitutional questions that have never been tested.
Can an administrative agency with delegated authority sub-
delegate that authority to SROs? Should SRO regulations be
viewed as state law or federal law? Is there a difference be-
tween listing standards, which were once a matter of contract
between exchanges and listed companies, and regulations of
stock exchange members and stock markets?
The uncertain status of stock exchange listing standards was
tested in Business Roundtable v. SEC, in which the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit Court")
abrogated an SEC rule attempting to impose a uniform voting
rights standard upon all national marketplaces. The court
found that the SEC regulation was a "rule" under Sections 19(b)
and 19(c) of the Exchange Act," but that it was not in further-
Just a Private Club: Self-Regulatory Organizations as State Actors When En-
forcing Federal Law, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 453, 483-84 (arguing that,
because Congress has delegated substantial powers to SROs in securities mat-
ters, SROs should be deemed state actors when enforcing federal law under
the Exchange Act).
47. The NASD was created under the authority of Section 15A of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1 (2000). See Roberet N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky
Investments for That Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio
Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIo N.U. L.
REV. 189, 197 n.32 (1998).
48. See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
49. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
50. Id. at 409. Under section 19(b), SROs are required to receive SEC ap-
proval of any and all new rules and any proposed changes to existing rules.
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1). The Commission then either approves the proposed
rule, or schedules a hearing in order to decide whether a proposal will be ac-
cepted. Id. § 78s(b)(2). Under section 19(c), the Commission also retains the
authority to itself amend the rules of a self-regulatory organization, "as the
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ance of the purposes of the Exchange Act." The court's ration-
ale was that there was no indication in the statute that Con-
gress intended to permit such a broad federal preemption over
corporate governance and shareholder rights - matters tradi-
tionally left to state law." Presumably, however, the exchanges
could have adopted the SEC's rule as a matter of non-federal
law, and they subsequently did so." Nevertheless, the SEC was
required under the Exchange Act to approve these "voluntary"
rules.'
B. Deregulation through Statutory Preemption
While the Supreme Court was allocating regulatory responsi-
bility for takeovers and other corporate restructurings based on
whether statutes involved matters of express federal policy re-
garding the protection of investors or internal corporate gov-
ernance, the securities industry was advocating preemption of
state blue-sky laws concerning securities offerings and the regu-
lation of broker-dealers and investment advisers. This move to
preempt state blue-sky laws found favor in the deregulatory
politics of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush,
and the Contract with America advocated by Newt Gingrich."
Initially, complaints concerning duplication and inconsistency
of unnecessary regulatory burdens were answered by a 1980
Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration
of the self-regulatory organization." Id. § 78s(c).
51. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410-17.
52. Id.
53. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing
Requirements, 54 SMU L. REv. 325, 346 (2001).
54. Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000). See also Self-
Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27,554, 54 Fed. Reg.
53,227 (Dec. 27, 1989) (release by which the SEC approved NYSE's original
voting rule); Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
28,517, 55 Fed. Reg. 41,626-01 (Oct. 12, 1990) (release by which SEC approved
NASD's adoption of the former SEC Rule 19b-4); Douglas C. Michael, Unten-
able Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards under the Securities
Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAw 1461, 1472 n.70 (1992) ("[A]lthough [SEC] Rule
19c-4 is invalid, its verbatim counterpart adopted by the NYSE still binds
listed companies.").
55. See Pritchard, supra note 27, at 436 n.5; Richard W. Painter, Respond-
ing to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of
Action, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 29 (1998).
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statute" adding Section 19(c)(1) to the Securities Act authoriz-
ing the SEC to cooperate with state government representatives
in securities matters to achieve effective, uniform securities
regulations with a minimum interference with the business of
capital formation." The statute mandated an annual confer-
ence of SEC and state regulators for the purpose of developing
uniform securities forms and procedures and a small issues ex-
emption from registration." Whether this act could have man-
dated the states to develop such forms, procedures and exemp-
tions is unclear under constitutional federalism. Further, the
act provided that "[niothing in this Act shall be construed as
authorizing preemption of State law.""0
Pursuant to this directive the SEC worked with the North
American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") to
develop a state law uniform limited offering exemption
("ULOE"). By 1996, thirty-eight states had adopted a form of
ULOE and ten other states had similar exemptions." A uni-
form system of registration for securities salesmen was also
worked out with the NASD." However, there was considerable
securities industry dissatisfaction with the slow and essentially
voluntary progress of the SEC and NASAA in achieving uni-
form regulations pursuant to Section 19(c)."
56. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477,
Sec. 505, § 19(c), 94 Stat. 2275, 2292-93 (adding Section 19(c) of the Securities
Act).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(d)(1)-(2) (2000).
58. Id. §§ 77s(d)(3)-(4).
59. Such action appears to be unconstitutional "commandeering" of states
by federal government. See Massey, supra note 27, at 433-34; Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot compel
states to enact a federal regulatory program); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992). Yet, it is unclear whether Congress might be able to accom-
plish this goal through preemption. See Massey, supra note 27, at 453-63,
505-06, 512-13. Recently, Congress adapted a more pointed threat of pre-
emption of state insurance regulation of agents in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 321, 113 Stat. 1338, 1422-24 (1999).
60. 15 U.S.C. §77s (c)(3)(C).
61. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.19 (4th ed.
2002).
62. See Securities Uniformity: Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securi-
ties Law, Securities Act. Release No. 33-7050, 56 S.E.C. Docket 764 (Nov. 2,
1994), available at 1994 WL 95225.
63. State Regulators Adopt Model Commodity Code, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 15, at 622 (Apr. 12, 1985); 12 JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW §
508 [Vol. 28:2
SECURITIES REGULATION U.S. & EU
Much more sweeping deregulation of the state blue-sky laws
through preemption was accomplished in the late 1990s, first by
the National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996
("NSMIA") and then by the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA").65 The NSMIA preempted
state securities law in three areas. First, it preempted blue-sky
securities registration, merit review and prospectus disclosure
requirements for SEC registered investment companies and
stock exchange and Nasdaq listed securities. It also preempted
blue-sky law in most private placements." Prior to the NSMIA,
blue-sky laws all contained a requirement for registration of
securities, but most state laws had an exemption from their
registration requirements for issuers listed on a national
securities exchange." The NASD had lobbied for Nasdaq listed
securities to be similarly exempt, but the NASAA wished for
greater control over the criteria for a blue chip exemption.68 The
NSMIA essentially mandated a blue chip exemption for all
nationally traded securities. This preemption did not
completely eliminate merit standards because the NASD
regulates underwriting terms and conditions with respect to
offerings underwritten by broker-dealers. 9 Further, this SRO
regulation is a uniform national standard. Whether it is federal
law or state law is an interesting question.
Second, the NSMIA preempted state regulation of broker-
dealers with respect to capital, custody, margin, financial re-
sponsibility, records, bonding and reporting requirements to the
7:32, at 7-71 to 7-73 (2002); Hugh H. Makens, et al., Blue Sky Practice Part I:
Doing it Right: Avoiding Liability Arising from State Private Offerings under
ULOE and Limited Offering Exemptions, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REGULATION D OFFERINGS AND PRIVATE
PLACEMENTS 271, 280 (2001); David F.E. Banks, Hawaii Response to Regula-
tion D, 23 HAWAII B.J. 1, 3 (1991); Mark A. Sargent & Hugh H. Makens,
ULOE: New Hope, New Challenge, 45 Bus. LAw. 1319, 1319-20 (1990).
64. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.)
65. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
66. 15 U.S.C. §77r (2000).
67. Sargent, supra note 3, at 833-35.
68. See NASAA Proposes '56 Uniform Act Amendments at Spring Meeting,
18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 399 (Mar. 21, 1986).
69. Conduct Rule 2710-2730, N.A.S.D. Manual, at 4501-31.
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extent inconsistent with federal law."0 Third, the SEC was
given exclusive regulatory authority over investment advisers
to SEC registered investment companies and advisers with $25
million or more in assets under management.7 The differing
language used by Congress in preempting state regulation of
broker-dealers and investment advisers is of interest. With re-
spect to broker-dealers, the NSMIA provided that:
No law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative ac-
tion of any State or political subdivision thereof shall establish
capital, custody, margin, financial responsibility, making and
keeping records, bonding, or financial or operational reporting
requirements for brokers, dealers, municipal securities deal-
ers, government securities brokers, or government securities
dealers that differ from, or are in addition to, the require-
ments in those areas established under this title.2
Although state licensing of persons associated with broker-
dealers was not preempted, the SEC was directed to conduct a
study of the impact of disparate state licensing requirements for
such persons."
With respect to investment advisers, the NSMIA provided
that "[nio law of any State or political subdivision thereof re-
quiring the registration, licensing, or qualification as an in-
vestment adviser ... shall apply to any person ... that is regis-
tered [with the SEC] as an investment adviser.""' Further, ad-
visers exempt from the definition of "investment advisor" in the
70. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3420-22 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§78o(h)(1) (2000)).
71. The Investment Adviser Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21
(2000).
72. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 3420, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78o(h)(1)
(2000)).
73. See id § 510(d), 110 Stat. 3416, 3451. See also Susan S. Krawczyk,
Recent Developments of Interest to Sellers of Variable Insurance Products, in
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONFERENCE ON LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY PRODUCTS: CURRENT SECURITIES, TAX, ERISA, AND STATE
REGULATORY ISSUES 239, 252-55 (1998) (discussing the objectives and conclu-
sions of the study).
74. National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290, sec. 303, §203A(b)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 3416, 3437 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1)(A) (2000)).
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federal securities laws were similarly exempt."5 Associated per-
sons could be licensed or registered only if any such person had
a place of business within a state." The preemption of state
regulation of SEC regulated broker-dealers and investment ad-
visers and their associated persons was not complete. The
states retained authority to investigate and bring enforcement
actions for fraud or deceit or other unlawful conduct by a bro-
ker-dealer or investment adviser or their associated persons."
The congressional justification for the preemption provisions
of the NSMIA was that the system of dual federal and state se-
curities regulation was unnecessary, because it was redundant,
costly and ineffective." Therefore regulatory responsibility was
allocated based on the nature of the securities offering." Inher-
ently national offerings were made subject only to federal regu-
lation. o There is some irony to such sweeping preemption of
state law emanating from a Republican Congress supposedly
committed to lessening federal regulation, but the NSMIA was
a deregulatory statute favored by business groups.81
The SLUSA was even more deregulatory and its way of effect-
ing preemption was more radical. It was adopted as a reaction
against attempts to evade the obstacles to federal securities
class actions erected by the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")" by using state court class actions. The
PSLRA did not change the provisions of the law covering securi-
ties anti-fraud actions, but it made plaintiff class action suits
more difficult by, among other things, reducing the control of
plaintiffs counsel over class action litigation;83 imposing stricter
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1) (2000).
78. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920, 3920-21.
79. Id. at 40.
80. Id.
81. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection:
Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities
Fraud, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 170 (1997).
82. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
83. "Appointing lead plaintiff on the basis of financial interest, rather than
on a 'first come, first serve' basis, was intended to endure that institutional
plaintiffs with expertise in the securities market and real financial interests
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pleading standards84 and providing a safe harbor for forward
looking information." These procedural reforms were aimed at
curbing abusive litigation in the federal courts; they left state
securities fraud actions alone." Some plaintiffs' lawyers reacted
by bringing class actions in securities fraud cases in state
courts, particularly in California.
High technology companies and other business groups then
lobbied for federal preemption on the grounds that the PSLRA
was being undermined and Congress obliged.87 Finding that
national uniformity was preferable to fragmentation because of
the need for predictability,"8 Congress engaged in selective pre-
emption by depriving state courts of the power to adjudicate
securities fraud class actions in cases involving securities listed
on a national stock exchange or the Nasdaq. The SLUSA pro-
vides that no class action based on state law alleging fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of a "covered security" may
be maintained in state or federal court and any such action
shall be removable to a federal district court and dismissed."
Although the Congress that passed the SLUSA was generally
committed to federalism, it found that promoting efficient na-
tional securities markets was a more convincing and compelling
interest than reinforcing state rights."
Although the Republican majority succeeded in pushing
through the SLUSA, there were strong dissents by Democrats
in both the Senate and the House. Senators Sarbanes, Bryan,
in the integrity of the market would control the litigation, not lawyers." In re
Donnkenny, Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-35 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730-34). Also, there is a stay of discovery while a motion to dismiss is pend-
ing. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000).
84. Specific factual allegations raising a strong inference of scienter must
be pled. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000).
85. 15 U.S.C. §78u-5 (2000).
86. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 287 (1998).
87. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemp-
tion of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1998).
88. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 3 (1998).
89. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, sec. 101, § 16, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)-
(c) (2000)).
90. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 5.
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and Johnson pointed out that roughly 60% of state class action
suits filed after the PLSRA were filed in California and al-
though one state should not set a "pro-plaintiff' national stan-
dard for securities fraud, Congress should not second-guess
California judgments in balancing the interests of local busi-
nesses against the interests of local investors.91 Dissenters in
the House similarly felt this avoidance of the PLSRA was a
problem for the California legislature. Further, they pointed
out the irony in "the Republican-led Congress that campaigns
on returning power to the states and protecting individual
choice [championing] a federal mandate abolishing important
state prerogatives along with protections and rights.""
C. Preemption of State Common Law in the Payment for Order
Flow Cases
Payment for order flow is the remuneration in the form of
monetary or other benefits given to retail securities broker-
dealers for routing customers' orders for execution to particular
wholesale dealers, market makers, or exchanges. 3 With the
advent of computer advances and automated trading systems,
this practice became increasingly widespread in the 1980s and
1990s,' although it may have diminished as a result of securi-
ties trading decimalization." Payment for order flow is a con-
troversial practice.' At one extreme it could be viewed as com-
mercial bribery. At the other extreme it could be viewed as wel-
come competition to the monopolistic trading practices of the
91. Id. at 13.
92. H. R. REP. No. 105-640, at 46 (1998).
93. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34,902, 59 Fed.
Reg. 55,006, 55,008 (Nov. 2, 1999).
94. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33,026, 58 Fed.
Reg. 52,934, 52,936 (Oct. 6, 1993). See also SEC, DIsiON OF MARKET
REGULATION, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS 8-9 (1994).
95. Since decimalization lowered spreads, the incentive for payment for
order flow arrangements decreased. See Unger, Exchange Officials Testify
Decimals Have Affected Depth, Liquidity of Trading, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 21, at 803 (May 28, 2001).
96. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33,026, 58 Fed.
Reg. 52,934, 52,935 (Oct. 6, 1993).
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stock exchanges and the NASD. 7 In any event, it raises ques-
tions about whether payment for order flow arrangements are
inconsistent with a broker's duty of best execution. There also
has been controversy as to whether payment for order flow
should be abolished or be regulated by federal or state law. 8
Concerned with the "securities industry's languor," such as
"misallocation of capital, widespread inefficiencies, and unde-
sirable and potentially harmful fragmentation of trading,"W9 in
1975 Congress enacted extensive amendments to the Exchange
Act and directed the SEC to facilitate the development of a na-
tional market system to promote efficiency and fair competition
in the securities industry. Pursuant to this mandate, the SEC
adopted Rule 10b-10 in 1977, which required brokers and deal-
ers to disclose, among other things, the amount of remuneration
received and the source and amount of any other remuneration
received.'" The 1977 version of Rule 10b-10 did not specifically
mention order flow as one of the "other remunerations."'01
The growth and pervasiveness of the practice, however,
aroused extensive debate over its merits and harms. In re-
sponse, the SEC conducted a comprehensive study of order flow
payments. The SEC concluded that the practice produced the
following economic benefits to customers: lower unit costs; in-
creased retail brokerage firm revenues; lowered commissions;
more expeditious executions; enhanced customer services; in-
creased competition from automated execution systems and re-
lated practices; increased competition between wholesale deal-
ers and exchanges and vertically integrated firms; and reduced
execution costs in all markets, including the exchanges. °" The
SEC also recognized the opposing concerns as to the possible
conflict of interest and breach of duty of best order execution."
97. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
19,047, 47 Fed. Reg. 41,896 (Sept. 22, 1982). For a review of the debate con-
cerning payment for order flow, see Note, The Perils of Payment for Order
Flow, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1675 (1994).
98. See id.
99. S. REP. No. 94-75, at 1 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 180.
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (2002).
101. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-13,508, 12 S.E.C. Docket No. 299
(May 5, 1997).
102. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33,026, 58 Fed.
Reg. 52,934, 52,939-40 (Oct. 13, 1993).
103. Id. at 52,936-37.
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In an attempt to address the issue with more particularity,
the SEC amended Rule 10b-10 in 1994." The amended Rule
10b-10, which became effective in October 1995, defined order
flow payment as any form or arrangement compensating bro-
kers or dealers in return for the routing of orders.'' The SEC
rejected as too burdensome and unworkable proposals that or-
der flow payments be passed through to the customers," as well
as its own initial proposal that brokers disclose the amount of
payments for order flow. °7 Amended Rule 10b-10, however, re-
quires a broker-dealer to disclose in each transaction confirma-
tion slip whether payment for order flow was received, and that
the source and nature of the payment would be available at the
customer's request. ' In addition, the SEC adopted a new rule,
llAcl-3, which requires annual disclosure to customers of a
broker's or dealer's policies regarding receipt of payments for
order flow, the market makers to which customer orders are
routed, and the aggregate amount of payments received for or-
der flow in the previous year.'
Subsequently, payment for order flow was tested in a number
of state courts in cases claiming breach of fiduciary duty. The
highest courts of New York, ' Minnesota,"' Illinois,"' and Penn-
sylvania,13 as well as two other states' intermediate appellate
courts" 4 found that the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act
and SEC disclosure regulations impliedly preempted state
common law regarding any breach of fiduciary duty involved in
payment for order flow practices."' Courts that considered the
104. See Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34,902, 59
Fed. Reg. 55,006 (Nov. 2, 1994).
105. Id. at 55,008.
106. Id. at 55,010-11 n.42.
107. Id. at 55,010 n.39.
108. Id. at 55,010.
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-3 (2002).
110. Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. 1996).
111. Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1996).
112. Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co., 688 N.E.2d 620 (Ill. 1997).
113. Shulick v. PaineWebber & Co., 722 A.2d 148 (Pa. 1998).
114. Eirman v. Olde Discount Corp., 697 So. 2d 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Mickey v. Charles Schwab & Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (Cal. App. 1998).
115. Some critics argued that these cases holding preemption of state law
threatened the dual securities regulatory regime Congress intended to pre-
serve. See, e.g., Anthony Szydlowsky, Comment, Preemption In The Securities
Industry: A Diminished Standard? 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 259, 261 (2000) (ar-
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issue of payments for order flow found express preemption prin-
ciples inapplicable because no clear language indicated such a
congressional preemptive intent."6 The question then became
whether and what kind of implicit preemption could be inferred.
In their determinations, courts devoted most of their attention
to the history of the Exchange Act, as amended in 1975, and the
evolution of SEC regulations relevant to order flow payments.
11 7
The Supreme Court of Minnesota and the New York Court of
Appeals were among the earliest to find preemption of state law
in payment for order flow cases."8
In Dahl v. Charles Schwab, Minnesota's highest court re-
jected both the plaintiffs' and the defendant's theory of express
preemption."9 The court held that implicit preemption, specifi-
cally under the obstacle principle, was applicable to the case.' 0
The court was very concerned with the national, and even in-
ternational, ramifications of its decision, since payment for or-
der flow was pervasive in the securities industry.2 ' Although
complying with both state and federal disclosure requirements
was not entirely impossible, the court reasoned, it was expen-
sive and difficult for brokers to determine order flow payments
on a case-by-case basis.'2 Usually, such payments were made
on an aggregate basis, and remuneration could take the form of
research service or other non-monetary services. Therefore,
requiring broker-dealers to disclose the amount of each individ-
ual order flow payment as the plaintiffs urged would operate to
terminate the practice, which the SEC found to have produced
more benefits than harms to investors.' 3 The court concluded
that since a state law cause of action could frustrate the na-
tional market system objectives of the SEC and Congress, it
was impliedly preempted.'
guing that Guice was decided incorrectly and created a bad preemption analy-
sis, that Congress explicitly preserved state law causes of action).
116. See Dahl, 545 N.W.2d at 923-24.
117. See, e.g., id. at 921-24.
118. See supra notes 110-11.
119. Dahl, 545 N.W.2d at 922-24.
120. Id. at 925.
121. See id. at 925-26.
122. Id. at 925.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 925-26.
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Six months later, in Guice v. Charles Schwab the New York
Court of Appeals agreed with the Dahl court's decision.'25 That
court - the highest in New York - performed a similarly thor-
ough analysis of the legislative history of the 1975 amendments
to the Exchange Act and the SEC's relevant regulations.2 The
court emphasized the agency's acknowledgment that order flow
payments furthered the purposes of Congress by enhancing
more efficient and less costly execution of customers' orders and
by promoting competition for order executions among all mar-
kets. 7 The court maintained that the SEC regulations regard-
ing disclosure requirements were less stringent than the appli-
cable state common law. 8 A mandatory disclosure of specific
monetary receipts, in its view, might have a deleterious effect
on the securities industry."9 Securities broker-dealers, facing
potentially nationwide class action civil liability, would be com-
pelled to comply with the different disclosure requirements of
each individual state. The resulting chaos in the securities
regulatory regime would frustrate the Congress's intent of es-
tablishing a nationally "coherent and rational regulatory struc-
ture" under the leadership of the SEC.'30 Because state law
would interfere with the methods by which the federal statute
was designed to reach a congressional goal, it was preempted."'
As for the effect of the savings clause, the court interpreted it as
negating only implied field preemption, not conflict preemp-
tion. '32
Other courts followed the reasoning of the Dahl and Guice
courts. The Illinois Supreme Court in Orman v. Charles
Schwab noted that the SEC in the 1994 amendments to Rule
10b-10 had "struck a deliberate balance" by requiring broker-
dealers to provide investors with key information while reject-
ing "impractical and burdensome disclosure requirements that
might compromise the contributions of the practice to market
125. Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282, 290 (N.Y. 1996).
126. See id. at 286-87.
127. Id. at 289-90.
128. See id. at 290.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 291.
132. Id. at 291-92.
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competition."'33 Significantly, even though the 1994 amend-
ments to Rule 10b-10 were not in effect at the time of the de-
fendants' challenged practice, the court found these amend-
ments "instructive as to the scope of the 1977 version of Rule
lOb-10.' 3 Citing Guice and Dahl the Orman court held that
the plaintiffs' state claims obstructed the purposes and objec-
tives of the Congress and thus were preempted."5
In Shulick v. PaineWebber, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania also found the Guice court's rationale convincing. '36 The
majority in Shulick emphasized that the purpose of Rule 10b-10
was to establish uniformity in the disclosure requirements per-
taining to order flow payments.17 However, as the concurring
opinion pointed out, the majority's preemption theory was field
preemption, differing from Guice's implied conflict preemp-
tion.'' The majority stated that "federal regulation of the nar-
row subject of disclosure of order flow payments is so thorough
that we have no difficulty finding the "reasonable inference...
that no room has been left for a state to impose additional re-
quirements."'3' The concurring opinion questioned the sound-
ness of this theory, finding it inappropriate to apply field pre-
emption to a particular issue within securities regulation rather
than the field as a whole. 4'
133. Orman, 688 N.E.2d at 623.
134. Id. at 626.
135. Id.
136. Shulick, 722 A.2d at 151.
137. See id. at 149.
138. See id. at 152 (Cappy, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 151.
140. Two other states' intermediate courts also have held federal securities
law preempted state law by implication. In Eirman v. Olde, 697 So. 2d 865
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), the District Court of Appeal of Florida for the
Fourth District found the reasoning of Guice, Dahl, and Orman to be persua-
sive and declined to follow two 1995 cases that reached different decisions.
See id.; Dumont v. Charles Schwab & Co., 1995 WL 262262 (E.D. La. 1995),
rev'd, 717 So.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Charles Schwab & Co., 1995
WL 626522, at *2 (W.D. La. 1995). See also Gilman v. Wheat, First Securities,
Inc. 896 F. Supp. 507 (D. Md. 1995). In Dumont, the U.S. District Court for
Eastern Louisiana, decided that there was no diversity and no federal ques-
tion because there was no complete federal preemption of the field of securi-
ties. See Dumont, 1995 WL 262262, at *2. In Thomas, the Tenth Judicial
District Court for the Parish of Nachitoches, Louisiana found no express pre-
emption nor inferred congressional preemptive intent. See Thomas, 1995 WL
626522, at *2.
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In McKey v. Charles Schwab, the court adopted the implied
preemption theory.'4' The court admitted that the preemptive
intent evidenced by the 1994 amendments to Rule 10b-10 and
the new rule llAcl were not applicable before October 1995,
the time of the challenged practice.4 ' However, it found the old
Rule 10b-10 dispositive.'43 The fact that the old rule did not
specifically mention order flow payments, in the McKey court's
view, did not mean that the rule was inapplicable.'"4 The court
believed that the old rule clearly evidenced an intent by the
SEC to "regulate any and all remuneration received by brokers,
no matter what the form."' In addition, the McKey court
adopted Guice's rationale that allowing each state to enforce its
own disclosure requirements would disturb the promotion of a
national market system, a goal expressed in the 1975 amend-
ments to the Exchange Act.'
In short, the majority of the state courts that considered cases
alleging that payment for order flow was a breach of fiduciary
duty have held that federal law and regulations impliedly pre-
empted state law. Except for the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, which found field preemption, all other courts found im-
plicit conflict preemption, because permitting state common law
cases to go forward would present an obstacle to the national
market system mandated by the Exchange Act.
D. The Resurgence of State Securities Regulators
On May 21, 2002, New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer announced an agreement by Merrill Lunch to enact sig-
nificant and immediate reforms to insulate securities research
analysts from its investment banking division and to change
the way analysts are compensated.'47 Under this settlement,
141. McKey v. Charles Schwab, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 219 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
142. Id. at 214-15, 219.
143. Id. at 219.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 219 n.6.
146. Id. at 219.
147. Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, N.Y.
State Dep't of Law, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement
to Reform Investment Practices (May 21, 2002), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press2002/may/may2 la.02.html.
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Merrill Lynch agreed, among other things: to sever the link be-
tween compensation for analysts and that for investment bank-
ing; prohibit investment banking input into analysts' compensa-
tion; to create a new investment review committee responsible
for approving all research recommendations; to disclose in its
research reports whether it has received or is entitled to receive
any compensation from a covered company over the past 12
months; and to pay a $100 million fine. "8 A NASAA task force
chaired by New York, California, and New Jersey led the inves-
tigation leading to this settlement.'49 The agreed upon fine is
$48 million payable to the New York State Department of Law,
$50 million to the remaining 49 states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico, and $2 million to NASAA. 0 This fine is only
required to be paid, however, if all 50 states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Puerto Rico agree.'"' The settlement agreement
between the New York Attorney General and Merrill Lynch
goes into considerable detail as to how Merrill Lynch analysts
will be compensated in the future and the types of disclosures
research reports will contain.5 2 This case is a prime example of
regulation by prosecution. Although the settlement does not by
its terms apply to the entire securities industry, there are simi-
lar ongoing investigations of other firms that could result in
similar settlements.
5 3
The case against Merrill Lynch brought by the New York At-
torney General was based on broad and general antifraud pro-
visions of the Martin Act, which prohibit any device scheme or
artifice to defraud or obtain money by means of any false pre-
tense, representation or promise, fictitious or pretended pur-
chase or sale, any concealment,' suppression, fraud, false pre-
tense or false promise in connection with the sale of securities
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Agreement Between the Attorney General of the State of N.Y. and
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., May 21, 2002 24, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/merrilllynch/nymerril152102agr.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Id. at T$ 5-11, 15.
153. See Charles Gasparino, Deals & Deal Makers: Citigroup Suggests Rules
for Analysts, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2002, at C5; Charles Gasparino, Cleaning
Up Wall Street: Morgan Stanley Goes to Washington, WALL ST. J., June 21,
2002, at C1 [hereinafter Gasparino, Cleaning Up Wall Street].
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or offering investment advice."M In the New York Attorney
General's view, in contrast to the requirements of the federal
securities laws, no purchase or sale of stock is required, nor are
intent, reliance or damages required elements of a violation.155
The gist of the Merrill Lynch case was that the internet re-
search analysts at Merrill Lynch regularly published ratings for
internet stocks that were misleading because: (1) the ratings in
many cases did not reflect true opinions; (2) no "reduce" or "sell"
recommendations were ever issued; and (3) Merrill Lynch did
not disclose that the analysts were acting as quasi-investment
bankers for the companies rated.'5
The role and conduct of securities analysts during the boom
years of the 1990s were subject to criticism and scrutiny by se-
curities regulators before the New York Attorney General sued
Merrill Lynch. As a result of the congressional hearings after
the collapse of Enron Corp., the SROs developed new regula-
tions governing analysts' conflicts of interest, which the SEC
approved in May 2002.'" The rules prescribe mandatory disclo-
sures about analysts' conflicts of interest and prohibit analysts
from receiving compensation directly tied to investment bank-
ing fees.5 8 After the action by the New York Attorney General,
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which con-
tains provisions to improve the objectivity of research ana-
lysts.'59 The SEC, or SROs under the authorization and direc-
154. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352(i) (McKinney's 1996).
155. Aft. in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Busi-




156. Id. at 3.
157. See SEC Gives Nod to Analyst Rules Aimed at Boosting Independence,
34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 749 (May 13, 2002); Self-Regulatory
Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NASD and
NYSE, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968-01
(May 15, 2002).
158. See NYSE Rule 472, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2472 (1995) (amended);
NASD Rule 2210, N.A.S.D. Manual, at 4171-80 (new). See also Order Ap-
proving Proposed Rule Changes and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Ac-
celerated Approval, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45,908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968
(May 16, 2002).
159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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tion of the SEC, are required to adopt rules addressing analysts'
conflicts of interest by erecting firewalls between analysts and
investment bankers and by mandating disclosures of analysts'
conflicts of interest. 1
60
The action by the New York Attorney General against Merrill
Lynch was controversial. House Financial Services Committee
Chairman Michael Oxley criticized the case as duplicative regu-
lation threatening to undermine the national securities regula-
tory regime and that it had the capability of balkanizing the
securities industry.' The securities industry generally favors
national regulation rather than regulation by 50 states. The
Securities Industry Association took the position that "the U.S.
needs a national securities framework from which to work, not
a patchwork.' 6 2 Morgan Stanley lobbied to attach a provision
preempting state securities regulators from examining securi-
ties analysts' conflicts of interest, but such a provision was not
included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200263 The new activism
of state prosecutors against business is widespread and - as is
exhibited by the Merrill Lynch case - has its roots in local gov-
ernments' efforts to protect consumers against the deregulatory
initiatives of the Reagan administration." Defenders of the
case against Merrill Lynch claim that the states have stepped
in to fill the void left by weak federal regulation.'" Eliot
Spitzer, in justifying his activism, claimed that "the SEC was
not doing enough."'"
160. Id. § 501(a).
161. See Press Release, House Comm. on Financial Services, Oxley Com-
ments on Spitzer ' Testimony (June 26, 2002), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/news.asp. See also Spitzer Spars With Ox-
ley, Baker After Urging Tough Conflict Rules, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 26, at 1042 (July 1, 2002).
162. See Susanne Craig, Local Enforcers Gain Clout on Street, WALL ST. J.,
June 21, 2002, at C1.
163. See Gasparino, Cleaning Up Wall Street, supra note 153.
164. See Russell Gold & Andrew Caffrey, United Crime Busters, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 1, 2002, at B1.
165. See Craig, supra note 162.
166. New Cops on the Beat, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 2002, at 77, 78. It
appears that the SEC did not cooperate with the New York Attorney General's
investigation. See Michael Schroeder, SEC Welcomes Prosecutions, WALL ST.
J., June 11, 2002, at A2.
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Within a year following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the SEC is required to adopt or compel the SROs to adopt
new regulations governing the conduct of securities analysts.'67
Although Congress did not directly preempt state action against
securities analysts, issues of implied or field preemption could
arise as a result of disparities between state securities regula-
tors' views of analysts' conflicts and those of the SEC. Fur-
thermore, not all state securities regulators agree with Spitzer's
approach; therefore, there could be fragmentation and inconsis-
tency in state securities regulation.'68
The battle between the SEC and NASAA, as is true of many
battles over national versus state or federal regulation, is politi-
cal and philosophical. It may also become a matter of law for
the courts to address. Under the payment for order flow cases,
it would not be difficult to find conflict or even field preemption
if SEC or SRO rulemaking results in regulations that take a
different approach from the settlement made between Merrill
Lynch and the New York Attorney General. But the payment
for order flow cases were private actions for damages. A court
might be reluctant to apply this analysis to prosecutions by a
state attorney general. Further, if the conflict that arises is
between regulatory action by a state official and a rule of an
SRO, is the conflict a federal constitutional conflict? Can an
SRO rule trump state law in all cases where the regulation was
mandated by a federal statute and approved by the SEC? 69
In addition, where a state action brought either by a prosecu-
tor or a private plaintiff is instituted as a broad statutory or
167. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (adding § 15D to
the Exchange Act).
168. See Matt Fleisher-Black, Spitzer Faces Hurdle Over Merrill Deal, N.Y.
L.J., July 22, 2002, at 1; Gold & Caffey, supra note 164.
169. It may be relevant to note that all SEC registered broker-dealers are
required by federal law to join the NASD. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (2000). See also Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914
F.2d 1564, 1573, 1574 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). Further, the NASD was created
pursuant to federal authorization in 1938. The Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L.
No. 719, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000)) (adding § 15A to
the Exchange Act of 1934). In a pending case, SROs are seeking to invalidate
disclosure rules of the Judicial Council of California that conflict with rules
for SRO arbitrators. See NYSE Sue to Block California Rules in Securities
Arbitrations; Preemption Cited, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1296
(Aug. 5, 2002).
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common law antifraud claim, it is difficult to find preemption
unless the SEC has acted by adopting detailed regulations as it
did with respect to payments for order flow. In Zuri-Invest AG
v. NatWest Finance, Inc. a federal district court held that a
state fraud action was not preempted by the federal securities
laws, including the NSMIA.'7° Rather, the primary purpose of
the NSMIA was to preempt state blue-sky laws regulating the
registration and underwriting of securities. It did not preclude
states from regulating fraudulent conduct or extinguish state
claims based on fraud.'71 Similar issues have arisen under the
SLUSA.
72
III. FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES
LAW IN THE EU
A. Sources of Law
The EU is not a national federal system, but rather a federa-
tion by treaty of member nations for limited purposes. The EU
aspires to reach certain goals expressed in the various treaties
that serve as the legal foundation for the EU'7' through legal
170. 177 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v.
Gleacher NatWest Corp., 2002 WL 373455 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2002); Gabriel
Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Finance, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Finance, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). But see Myers v. Merrill Lynch, 1999 WL 696082, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 23, 1999), affd, 249 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2001).
171. See also H.R. REP. No. 104-622 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3877, 3896 ("Committee's intention not to alter ... State statutory or common
law with respect to fraud or deceit .... ).
172. See Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2002) (state con-
tract claim not preempted by SLUSA).
173. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997,
O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997), arts. 9, 99, 105, 108 (as in effect 1957) (now arts. 46,
103, 105, 107) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. The Treaty on European Union sig-
nificantly amended the earlier treaties and set forth the framework for mone-
tary and fiscal union and the establishment of the European Central Bank.
TEU OR MAASTRICHT TREATY: TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (EU), Feb. 7, 1992,
1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253.
The founding treaties leading to the establishment of EU include:
ESCS or PARIS TREATY: TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL
COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; EEC or TREATY OF ROME:
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3; EAEC or EURATOM Treaty: TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167;
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actions initiated by the European Commission ("Commission"),
which may take the form of directives or regulations.17 ' Such
legislation is then sent to the European Parliament'7 and
adopted by the Council of Ministers.'76 Directives are not gener-
ally self operating but must be implemented through the na-
tional laws of the various member states, whereas regulations
are directly applicable throughout the EU. In addition, the pro-
visions of the treaties which govern the EU directly apply to the
member states. The EU does not have any treaty provision
comparable to the Supremacy Clause, so preemption of national
law is not possible, but federal enforcement mechanisms do ex-
ist.
The Commission can, at the request of a member state, bring
an action against another member for failing to adopt a law im-
plementing a directive, or for having legislation that is contrary
to a directive, regulation or treaty provision. Also, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice may strike down a national law as con-
trary to a treaty provision in a case instituted by the Commis-
MERGER TREATY: TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Apr. 8, 1965, 1967 J.O. 152/1 (in
French); SEA: SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25
I.L.M. 506 (an act modifying the basic treaties); TEU OR MAASTRICHT TREATY:
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (EU), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M.
253; TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED
ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).
174. The European Commission is composed of twenty Commissioners, two
from each of the five largest member states, and one from each of the smaller
states, appointed by their respective national governments. EC TREATY, art.
157. Since directives are given legal effect only through national laws, rights
and duties are not conferred on individuals by a directive. Id. art. 189. Some-
times, however, a member state will be held liable for its failure to timely
adopt a directive. Id. art. 171. See Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzarnt
Traustein, [1970] E.C.R. 825. The direct applicability of regulations is based
on Article 249 of the EC Treaty.
175. The TEU changed the power of Parliament with respect to legislation
from purely advisory to one of cooperation and co-decision. See EC TREATY,
supra note 173, arts. 249, 251, 252 (as in effect 1957) (now arts. 189, 189b,
189c). Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the peo-
ples of Europe. Id. art. 190 (now art. 138).
176. The Council of Ministers is composed of one national representative
from each member state and has the capacity to enact EU legislation and is
the principal decision making body of the Union. Id. arts. 202, 203 (now arts.
145, 146).
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sion or by one member state against another.'77 Although the
EU does have some administrative bodies, with the exception of
the European Central Bank, these agencies do not have regula-
tory powers comparable to U.S. federal agencies such as the
SEC. 78
The primary thrust of the European Economic Community
Treaty ("EEC Treaty") was to create a single European eco-
nomic market, primarily through harmonization and mutual
recognition of national laws providing for the free movement of
goods, services, people and capital. The Treaty of the European
Union ("TEU") further advanced economic integration through
the establishment of a common European currency and central
bank and moved beyond economic union with the introduction
of the concept of European citizenship, but then retreated from
federalism by adopting the principle of subsidiarity.' 9 It has
been argued that this was a political reaction against the use of
mutual recognition as a smoke screen for deregulation at a na-
tional level.8 ° The subsidiarity principle requires EU action to
be taken only where the objectives of the treaties cannot be
adequately achieved at a national level and can be better
achieved by EU action. However, these tests apply only when
the EU acts outside its exclusive competence. This attempt at
allocating power between member states and the EU has not
resolved the ambiguities of shared legal power.''
B. Incomplete Harmonization of Securities Regulation
The Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundation for the Euro-
pean Economic Communities ("EEC") in 1957, was designed to
remove all restrictions on the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital within the EU.' 2 This plan was furthered
177. Id. arts. 226, 227 (now arts. 169, 170). See also Case C-483/99, Re
Golden Shares: Commission v. French Republic, 2 C.M.L.R. 49 (2002).
178. See Andrea M. Corcoran & Terry L. Hart, The Regulation of Cross Bor-
der Financial Services in the EU Internal Market, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 221,
232-33 (2002).
179. EC TREATY, supra note 173, arts. 4, 5, 8, at 17-22.
180. See Imelda Maher, Legislative Review by the EC Commission, in NEW
LEGAL DYNAMIcs OF EUROPEAN UNION 235, 236 (Jo Shaw & Gillian Moore eds.,
1995).
181. Id. at 237.
182. EC TREATY, supra note 173.
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by the EC White Paper of 1985, which set forth a program for
creating a single European market by 1992. The single market
was envisioned as expansive and flexible in order to ensure that
resources, including capital and investment, would flow into the
areas of greatest economic advantage.83 National regulators
would continue to play a supervisory role, but financial services
would be liberalized by putting into effect EU-wide minimum
standards that would supersede former national regulations."
A timetable for the adoption of securities law directives was
included in the White Paper."5 The White Paper was then im-
plemented by the Single European Act amendments to the
Treaty of Rome, which encouraged and facilitated the use of
directives to harmonize the laws of Member States.'86 The TEU
or Maastrict Treaty which came into effect in 1993 then pro-
vided for an economic and monetary union including a common
currency."' The objective of these efforts was to remove techni-
cal barriers, which either added costs or restricted entry into
particular markets, thereby impeding the free movement of
goods, services, persons and capital.
The Commission recognized that abolition of anticompetitive
practices was not sufficient to create a common financial mar-
ket. There was a need for EU-wide rules to underpin the stabil-
ity of the financial system and to provide a satisfactory level of
protection for consumers. The mechanism chosen for integra-
tion of the financial markets was a series of directives to har-
monize essential standards throughout the EU and to enable
financial regulators to practice home country control, but oblige
them to honor principles of mutual recognition. Four groups of
financial law directives were adopted relating to the efforts to
develop a single securities market in the EU. These were direc-
tives on financial disclosure, directives covering public securi-
ties offerings and stock exchange listings, directives regulating
trading markets, and directives regulating financial intermedi-
aries.
183. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal
Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM(83)310 final at 8 [hereinafter White Paper].
184. Id. at 103.
185. Id. Annex, at 26-27.
186. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 503 (1987).
187. TEU, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
20031 527
BROOK J. INT'L L.
As a result of these directives, securities regulation has been
partially but incompletely harmonized. There still is not an
integrated European capital market enabling issuers to float
public offerings or savers to invest and trade across national
borders in a single market. '88 The author previously advocated
the creation of a European Securities Commission to achieve
the integration of European capital markets comparable to the
integration of European monetary markets that was achieved
by the creation of the euro and the European Central Bank.'89
Other commentators have similarly argued in favor of a Euro-
pean Securities Commission,'" while some others have either
opposed the idea, or argued that the time is not ripe for such a
development.'
There is a serious question as to whether a European Securi-
ties Commission could be organized under existing treaty provi-
sions. Although power to create such a Commission could be
impliedly found in the existing provisions, an amendment to the
TEU probably would be necessary.92 The establishment of the
European Central Bank required an amendment to the EC
treaty, and since there has been strenuous objection from the
British to a European Securities Commission, it is unlikely that
188. Financial Services: Implementing the Framework For Financial Mar-
kets: Action Plan, COM(99)232 final at 6 [hereinafter Financial Services Ac-
tion Plan].
189. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commis-
sion, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9 (1992).
190. See Gilles Thieffry, The Case for a European Securities Commission, in
REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE 21k ' CENTURY 211, 231
(Eilis Ferran & Charles A.E. Goodhart eds., 2001).
191. See Karel Lannoo, Does Europe Need an SEC? Securities Market
Regulation in the EU (1996), available at www.ecmi.com (last visited Mar. 20,
2003); BENN STEIL & ERICK BERGLOF, THE EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS: THE
STATE OF THE UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE MILLENNIUM 136 (1996); Andrew
Whittaker, A European Law for Regulated Markets? Some Personal Views, in
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND
BEYOND 269, 273 (Guido Ferrarini ed., 1998). See also Eddy Wymeersch,
Regulating European Markets: The Harmonization of Securities Regulation in
Europe in the New Trading Environment, in REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES
AND MARKETS IN THE 21' CENTURY 189, 192-93.
192. See Thieffry, supra note 190, at 222-23; Eddy Wymeersch, From Har-
monization to Integration in the European Securities Markets, 3 J. CORP. L. &
SEC. REG. 1 (1981).
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a well constructed securities commission could be established
without a treaty amendment. 113
As a result of the adoption of several capital markets direc-
tives, especially the Investment Services Directive ("ISD")"u and
the Insider Dealing Directive,195 and in response to marketplace
and political developments, new national government securities
regulators were created in some European countries that previ-
ously lacked such regulators." Other national regulators were
reformed and securities regulation became more centralized.9 '
National regulators can be a force for further harmonization,
but to some extent their interests diverge, because established
national securities commissions do not wish to cede power to
one another or to a federal securities commission.
Although securities regulation in Europe has generally im-
proved since the White Paper and Single European Act 1992
deadline, dissatisfaction with the pace of capital markets inte-
gration in Europe led to the Financial Services Act Plan ' in
193. See Thieffry supra note 190, at n.41.
194. Council Directive 93/22 of 10 May 1993 on Investment in Services in
the Securities Field, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27, as amended by corrigendums to
93/22, 1993 O.J. (L 170) 32, 1993 O.J. (L 194) 27.
195. Council Directive No. 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30.
196. See Stephen J. Leacock, In Search of a Giant Leap: Curtailing Insider
Trading in International Securities Markets By the Reform of Insider Trading
Laws Under European Council Directive 89/592, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
51, 55 (1995). Germany did not have a federal securities regulator until it was
required to do so to implement the Insider Dealing Directive. Id. at 62-63.
The Netherlands established the Netherlands Authority for the Financial
Markets on March 1, 2002 to oversee the entire financial market sector. See
News: STE becomes Authority for the Financial Markets (Feb. 28, 2002), at
http://www.autoriteit-fm.nl/.
197. On December 1, 2001, the U.K.'s Financial Services Authority became
a single regulator through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. See
Financial Services Authority, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ (last modified Sept. 5,
2002). On July 2, 1996 France's Commission des Operations de Bourse was
given wider powers (sanctioning ability, etc.). See Commission des Operations
de Bourse, at http://www.cob.fr/cobgb/. Germany's Bundesanstalt fur Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin) took over the function of the earlier
BAWe on May 1, 2002 and has much more regulatory power than. before. See
BAFin, at http://www.bawe.de/english/index-re_e.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2003).
198. Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 188.
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1999 and the Lamfalussy Report"9 in 2001. The Financial Ser-
vices Action Plan, which was two years in the making, was an
aspirational program by the European Commission for more
rapid progress toward a single financial market." It was
prompted by a sense that despite the introduction of the euro,
the capital markets in Europe had remained fragmented. It set
forth as strategic objectives the development of a single EU
wholesale market where, among other things, capital could be
raised on an EU-wide basis and EU companies would produce a
single set of financial statements, open and secure retail mar-
kets, and state of the art prudential rules and supervision."'
The Commission recognized that an overhaul of the way the
EU developed financial services legislation was needed to
achieve these goals. A European Securities Commission was
not recommended but other mechanisms were suggested to
avoid piecemeal and reactive protracted decision-making and
the inflexibility of regulation by directives." One suggestion
was a high level forum to consult with affected interest groups
and to forge a consensus between national financial regulators
on emerging challenges."2 Another suggestion was acceleration
of co-decision procedures of the European Parliament." Im-
plementation of these suggestions would impinge on the Com-
mission's legal right of initiative and the European Parliament's
hard-won right of the co-decision, and the latter proved politi-
cally troublesome.
In response to the Financial Services Action Plan, the EcoFin
Council appointed a Committee of Wise Men under the Chair-
manship of Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy, which issued its final
report on February 15, 2001."5 The Report sets forth the bene-
fits of capital market integration, a long litany of areas in which
necessary European rules governing the capital markets are
199. THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
WISE MEN ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (2001),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/finances/generalV
lamfalussyen.pdf. [hereinafter LAMFALUSSY REPORT].
200. Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 188, at 3-4.
201. Id. at 22-28.
202. Id. at 16.
203. Id. at 16-17.
204. Id. at 17-18.
205. LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 199, at 189.
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needed, and reasons why the regulatory process is too slow, too
rigid, produces ambiguous regulations, and fails to distinguish
between core principles and day-to-day implementing rules.2"
Blame was assigned to the legislative process itself, especially
co-decision procedures and subsidiarity principles."7 The Lam-
falussy Report did not recommend the creation of a European
Securities Commission, but rather the establishment of two
new committees - an EU Securities Committee, with high level
members appointed by EU member states, and an EU Securi-
ties Regulators Committee, composed of the heads of member
state securities regulators. The Lamfalussy Report took a four-
tiered approach to regulatory reform:28 (1) framework princi-
ples would continue to be decided by normal EU legislative pro-
cedures; (2) the two new Committees would assist the Commis-
sion in implementing the framework principles; (3) enhanced
cooperation and networking among EU securities regulators
would lead to common implementing standards; and (4) the
European Commission would be prodded to engage in strength-
ened enforcement of community lawY.2 ' The Lamfalussy Report
also recommended a greater use of regulations rather than di-
rectives.Y
Although the Lamfalussy Report was welcomed by the finan-
cial community, it was not so well received by the European
Parliament, which feared its co-equal legislative powers would
be undermined. After a delay of almost a year, however, the
European Parliament agreed to have a lesser say on secondary
securities legislation and the EU Securities Committee came
into existence. 1 In addition, the Committee of European Secu-
rities Regulators ("CESR") was constituted as a successor to the
Federation of European Securities Commissions ("FESCO").2 12
206. Id. at 9-15.
207. Id. at 13-14.
208. Id. at 19, 30-33.
209. Id. at 19.
210. Id. at 26.
211. See generally Karel Lannoo & Mattias Levin, Securities Market Legis-
lative Procedures in the EU (CEPS) (on file with author). See also Commission
of the European Communities, Commission Decision Establishing the Euro-
pean Securities Committee, COM(2001)1493 final.
212. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision
Establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators,
COM(2001)1501 final. See also Corcoran & Hart, supra note 178, at 281-82.
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A report by the European Commission was issued in June
2002 at the half-way stage of the implementation timetable for
the Financial Services Action Plan.13 Although of the forty-two
original measures in the plan twenty-six have been completed,
important initiatives, such as updating the regular reporting
requirement for raising capital on an EU wide basis, amending
the ISD, and a directive on takeover bids, have not been
achieved. 4 Regulation accomplished, however, one very impor-
tant achievement. As of 2005, all listed EU companies will be
required to report their financial results according to interna-
tional accounting standards."5
It remains to be seen whether harmonization of securities
laws and regulations and integration of the European capital
markets will be accomplished by way of the fast track proce-
dures recommended in the Lamfalussy Report. Also, it is diffi-
cult to predict how the current world wide stock market turmoil
will impact both U.S. and EU securities regulation. As the
Lamfalussy Report itself pointed out, a failure of its recom-
mended approach could lead to a treaty amendment creating a
single EU regulatory authority for financial services."6
IV. TAKEOVER REGULATION
A. Impasse in the U.S.
A conflict between federal and state interests with respect to
securities regulation arises when there is a tender offer to pur-
chase the shares of a target corporation. This collision of law
may also be described as a conflict between securities law and
corporation law. In a tender offer for cash (or notes),17 the
shareholders of the target company are deprived of any going
213. European Commission, Financial Services: An Improving Climate -
But Quite Some Way to Go, COM(02)267 at 2, available at http://europa.eu.
int/comm/internalmarket/en/finances/actionplanindex.htm.
214. Id. at 10.
215. Id. at 4.
216. Thieffry, supra note 190, at 233.
217. In the U.S., takeovers generally are for cash; in the U.K., due to tax
implications, they are generally for notes. This difference leads to a conflict
between U.S. and U.K. law concerning takeovers. See Cross-Border Tender
Offers, Business Combinations and Rights Offerings, Securities Act Release
No. 33-7611, 63 Fed. Reg. 69,136, n.41 (Dec. 15, 1998)
[Vol. 28:2532
SECURITIES REGULATION U.S. & EU
forward interest in the profits of the target company; and their
rights as shareholders cease. If the tender offer is for securities
of the bidder, or results in a merger with the bidder, then the
shareholders of the target company become the shareholders of
a larger combined enterprise. In either event, the tender offer
is an urgent, material transaction affecting the very existence of
the target company."8 Further, although shareholders gener-
ally benefit economically from a takeover because they enjoy a
premium for control, other corporate constituencies, particu-
larly management and labor, are likely to be disadvantaged by
a takeover."9
In 1968, the U.S. Congress passed the Williams Act regulat-
ing takeovers, adding Sections 13(d) and 14(e) to the Exchange
Act. " Although a stated purpose of the Williams Act was to
maintain neutrality between the bidder and target in a tender
offer contest,"' the statute was intended to protect investors
confronted by a takeover bid. It accomplished this objective by
requiring certain disclosure by the bidder concerning a tender
offer and regulating the manner in which a tender offer is con-
ducted." Very generally, many commentators and the SEC
were persuaded that takeovers were not only good for share-
holders, but also that control contests were a check on man-
agement, which weeded out corporate leaders who were not ef-
fective.2
Managements threatened by hostile takeovers developed a
variety of defense mechanisms, including poison pills, selling
218. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
219. Bondholders may also be disadvantaged. See Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 906 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1990).
220. See supra note 37.
221. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
222. See Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7760, 70 S.E.C. Docket 2229 (Oct. 22, 1999).
223. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allan Ferrell, A New Approach to
Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 159 (2001);
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV.
1028 (1982); William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repel-
lents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, A.B.F. REs. J.
341, 347-52 (1983); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Proper Role for
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161 (1981); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73
VA. L. REV. 111 (1987).
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the crown jewels, staggered boards, control clauses, and golden
parachutes. These mechanisms were generally upheld under
state corporate law as appropriate unless a corporation was in
effect put up for sale by management."4 Efforts to invalidate
anti-takeover mechanisms through suits in the federal courts
under the Williams Act failed because the U.S. Supreme Court
viewed these defenses as matters of internal corporate man-
agement covered by state corporate law so long as full disclo-
sure was made.2 5 Although the SEC was able to adopt rules
under the Williams Act to prohibit some of the defenses permit-
ted by state corporate law,226 when the SEC attempted to outlaw
the potent anti-takeover device of lesser voting shares for public
stockholders, the D.C. Circuit Court struck down the SEC's rule
as being beyond its statutory authority.227
In addition to the conflicts between the Williams Act and
state corporate law that were fought out in state and federal
courts, management and labor groups were able to persuade
state legislatures to pass anti-takeover statutes. Early statutes
either unduly delayed the takeover process or permitted state
blue-sky commissioners to conclude that takeovers were unfair.
Such a statute was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as
unconstitutional.28 Later state statutes, which imposed delays
in the tender offer process, prohibited control share merger
transactions for a period of years, or endorsed the consideration
by corporate managers of non-shareholder constituencies in
control contests, were upheld by the federal courts.29
224. See Paramount Comm. Inc. v. Times Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v.
Household Int'l. Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
225. See Schreiber v. Burlington N. Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe Indus.
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
226. See, e.g., All Holders and Best Price Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10
(1987) (upheld in Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988)).
227. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
228. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
229. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987);
Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989). See Roberta S. Karmel, The Duty of Direc-
tors to Non-Shareholder Constituencies in Control Transactions, 25 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 61, 66-70 (1990).
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The refusal of the federal courts to invalidate most state anti-
takeover legislation, or to endorse SEC efforts to curb takeover
defenses, left the task of articulating how management should
behave in control contests to the state courts. Because a major-
ity of U.S. public corporations are incorporated in Delaware,
decisions by the Delaware state courts became determinative of
how the relevant law developed.2 3' The only national standard
applicable to contests for corporate control other than the dis-
closure and specific procedural provisions of the Williams Act
are stock exchange listing standards, which have an ambiguous
legal footing. Although they originated in state contract laws,
they are SRO "rules" under the Exchange Act, subject to SEC
review and approval.23" '
Most academics have criticized the impasse that developed
between federal and state law with regard to takeovers, believ-
ing that takeovers are important mechanisms for protecting
shareholders and disciplining corporate managers.232 But the
Main Street interests that question the wisdom of encouraging
hostile takeovers are probably at least as powerful as the Wall
Street interests favoring hostile takeovers. Therefore it is
unlikely that state anti-takeover statutes or state corporate law
giving corporate management considerable leeway in respond-
ing to takeover bids will be overturned, unless economic devel-
opments create a new consensus with respect to contests for
corporate control.233
B. Impasse in Europe
Like the U.S., the EU has thus far been unable to reconcile
the political and legal interests that clash in the takeover
arena. On July 4, 2001, a twelve year effort by the European
Commission to adopt an EU Takeover Directive failed by a tie
vote of 273-273 in the European Parliament.' This was a seri-
ous set-back for economic liberalization and integration of the
230. See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of
Directors in American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 339 (1998).
231. See ABA, Market Structure Report, supra note 4, at 1516-27.
232. See Edward B. Rock, America's Shifting Fascination with Comparative
Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 375-78 (1996).
233. See Pinto, supra note 230, at n.59.
234. See Pull up the Drawbridge, ECONOMIST, July 7, 2001, at 67.
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European capital markets. The Takeover Directive was mired
in politics from its inception and its various iterations and final
defeat over the past decade illustrate the problems of develop-
ing a single European capital market.
In the U.K., management of corporations works primarily for
the benefit of shareholders; whereas, on the continent, man-
agement and directors owe equal loyalty to shareholder claims
and those of creditors and labor. This fact accounts for the key
differences in business environments for hostile takeovers in
the U.K. and on the continent, and resulted in impediments to
the adoption of the Takeover Directive. 3' Hostile takeovers are
common in London and are regulated by the Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers, a self-regulatory body that operates pursu-
ant to the City Code on Takeover and Mergers ("City Code").
The two most important principles in the City Code are that the
shareholders of an offeree company must decide whether or not
an offer should succeed, and that all equity holders must be
treated equally. In addition, after an offer is communicated to
the board, or even when a board has reason to believe an offer is
imminent, the offeree board is prohibited from taking any ac-
tion without the approval of shareholders at a general meeting
"which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frus-
trated or in the shareholders being denied an opportunity to
decide on its merits."3 ' The initial draft of the Thirteenth Di-
rective on Company Law, patterned after the City Code to some
extent, was concerned with the equal treatment of the parties
involved in takeovers and the transparency of corporate take-
overs while a takeover bid was in progress."'
Since capital formation depends upon equity capital in the
U.K. there is a constant monitoring of management perform-
235. See Ingrid Depser, Amended EC Proposal for a 13"h Council Directive on
Company Law Concerning Takeovers and Other General Bids, 19 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 483, 484 (1991).
236. PANEL ON TAKEOVER AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL AcQUISITIONS OF SHARES 7
(3d ed. 1990).
237. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concern-
ing Takeover and Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8. There was a provi-
sion for a mandatory bid once a threshold position of one-third of the voting
shares was acquired. Also, controlling target-company shareholders would
have been required to act in the interests of all shareholders by not frustrat-
ing the bid.
536 [Vol. 28:2
SECURITIES REGULATION U.S. & EU
ance, protection of minority shareholders, and efficient resource
allocation. In contrast, in Germany and in other continental
states, management is given a long-term mandate, and its first
duty is to the business and then to the employees and the com-
pany's bankers. Further, in Germany there is stable and
knowledgeable business ownership with close ties to banks.
Given this difference, the British regarded takeovers as the ul-
timate discipline over bad management, whereas the Germans
considered hostile bids as inimical to the three ingredients of
their post-war success - management's ability to take a long-
term view, harmonious labor relations, and the disciplinary
function of German banks. Accordingly, German law counte-
nanced numerous barriers to hostile takeovers. 8 The Germans
and other continentals opposed the Thirteenth Directive, be-
cause they believed it adopted the pro-takeover underpinnings
of the U.K. system. The British also opposed it, because they
did not wish to see their self-regulatory system be replaced by a
statutory system.
However, the Commission insisted that there was a need to
facilitate the restructuring of European companies to meet in-
ternational competition, so an amended version of the Thir-
teenth Directive was put forth.39 By this time, takeover activity
had increased somewhat and the need for shareholder protec-
tion had become more apparent.4' The amended Thirteenth
Directive required each Member State to designate a supervi-
sory authority to put it into effect, a requirement that previ-
ously had been included in the EU Insider Trading Directive.41
There was also provision for mutual recognition. 42  The
amended Thirteenth Directive fared no better, however, in
238. See Depser, supra note 235, at 484.
239. 1990 O.J. (C 240) 9.
240. See Lois Moore, The EC's Proposed Takeover Directives, N.Y. L.J., May
28, 1991, at 1.
241. The supervisory authorities were then given the mandate to assure,
among other things, that holders of securities in the target company would be
treated equally; target company shareholders would have time and informa-
tion to reach an informed decision on the bid and the target company board
would not frustrate the bid. Mandatory bid provisions and mandated disclo-
sure in offering documents also were specified. See Amended Commission
Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company law Concerning
Takeover and Other General Bids, art. 6, 1989 O.J. (C 240) 7, 15.
242. See id. art. 6(3).
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achieving acceptance and a consensus in favor of adopting it,
than the original proposed directive. In 1997, a new and
streamlined proposal for a takeover directive was put forward
by the Commission.43 This proposal took into account the sub-
sidiarity principle and left member states some latitude in de-
ciding how to achieve the goals of the directive. The directive
would have applied to a company's securities traded on a regu-
lated market governed by the law of an EU member state.
Nevertheless, the general principles of the amended Thirteenth
Directive that would have been followed in national law were
unchanged y"
The twice amended directive remained an anathema to the
British, who feared that, despite the recognition of the Takeover
Panel as a proper supervisory authority, it would change the
workings of the Panel by tangling its operations in endless legal
challenges."5 When the British finally agreed to support it, the
Directive became mired in a spat between Britain and Spain
243. See Amended Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth European Parlia-
ment and Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids, 1997
O.J. (C 378) 10.
244. The general principles were: (1) holders of securities in target compa-
nies who are in the same position must be treated equally; (2) the addressees
of a bid must have sufficient time and information to enable them to reach a
properly informed decision; (3) the board of an offeree company must act in
the interests of the company as a whole; (4) false markets must not be created
in the securities of companies involved in a bid; and (5) target companies must
not be hindered in the conduct of their business beyond a reasonable time.
See Amended Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive, art. 5,
1997 O.J. (C 378) 15. Further, the establishment of national rules would have
been necessary in order to make public a decision to bid once the supervisory
authority and target company were notified and the bidder would have been
required to draft a disclosure document and submit it to the supervisory au-
thority. Id. art. 6, at 16-17. The Directive recognized that prompt an-
nouncement of an intention to launch a takeover bid reduces opportunities for
insider trading. Id. art. 7, at 17. The target company board would have been
prohibited from taking action to affect the success of the bid after receiving
notification of the bid. Id. art. 8, at 17-18. Rules would have had to have
been published on withdrawal or nullity of bids, revision of bids, treatment of
competing bids, and disclosure of the outcome. Id. art. 9, at 18. Whether
mandatory bids would have been required at any point was left to the laws of
the Member States. Id. art. 10, at 18.
245. See More Talks on Defining Takeover Bids Directive, EUR. REP., Jan.
19, 1999, available at 1999 WL 8305668; Euro-Takeovers, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 14,
1997, at 17.
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over Gibraltar. In the meantime, pressure in Europe grew to
harmonize an array of takeover laws that had been adopted in
the major European economies and had provisions that differed
widely. Some were based on shareholder protection principles.
Others were more friendly to target managements by permit-
ting defense mechanisms. 46 Then, in April 2001, just as the
Council and the European Parliament were on the verge of
reaching an agreement to reconcile their differences over the
Takeover Directive, Germany withdrew its support for the
measure because of its concerns that U.S. companies would
prey on German companies. 47 Until this time, all fifteen EU
member states had agreed that company boards would be re-
quired to get shareholder approval before adopting poison pills,
but Germany wanted to water down this provision and let man-
agement decide on poison pills.48 It was pressure from German
companies, which, following the hostile takeover of Mannes-
mannr6hren-Werke AG by Vodafone, feared takeovers of com-
panies such as Volkswagen, that ultimately defeated the Take-
over Directive in the European Parliament, where a tie vote
constitutes a veto, since a majority vote is required to approve a
directive.
This was not the end of the story, however. A week after the
defeat of the Takeover Directive, the German government ap-
proved a draft takeover law intended to provide options for tar-
get companies to defend against hostile takeovers, and stated
that it intended to continue pushing for an EU directive on
takeovers. 9 After several drafts were presented, a new Ger-
man Takeover Act, offering legal rules generally in line with
international standards and providing for effective enforcement,
became effective on January 1, 2002."' As a result, German
managements are now more limited in adopting defensive
246. See Anita Raghavan & Thomas Kamm, Pressure Grows to Unify
Europe's Takeover Laws, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1999, at A28.
247. See EU Expects Corporate Takeover Directive To Pass Despite Loss of
German Backing, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 683 (May 7, 2001).
248. See Paul Meller, Europe Plan on Mergers Hits a Snag, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 2001, at Wl.
249. See Cabinet Adopts Draft Takeover Law Meant to Protect Target Com-
panies, 7 World Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 5 (July 2001).
250. See Hans-Michael Giesen, The New German Public Takeover Law, 31
INT'L L. NEWS 1, 23 (2002).
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measures to unwelcome takeovers, but they will continue to
have more latitude in erecting barriers to takeovers than man-
agements of U.K. companies.25 '
In addition, the Commission continued to push for an EU-
wide takeover regime. It acted on two fronts. First, it set up a
High Level Group of Company Law Experts ("High Level
Group") to provide advice on issues related to pan-European
rules for takeover bids. 52 Second, it successfully prosecuted a
case invalidating France's golden share in Soci~t6 National Elf-
Aquitaine."3 These two developments have laid the foundation
for a new EU Takeover Directive which may eventually be
adopted.
The High Level Group determined that takeover bids are ba-
sically beneficial. It endorsed a level playing field for takeovers,
that is, takeover bids should be undertaken with a similar ex-
pectation of success across the EU, and shareholders should in
all member states have corresponding opportunities to tender
their shares.54 The High Level Group set forth two principles
for achieving a level playing field. First, in the event of a take-
over bid, the ultimate decision as to tendering shares to a bid-
der and for what price should rest with the shareholders.55
Second, shareholders should normally carry control rights in
proportion to the risk their shares carry.
256
251. Id. at 22.
252. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF
COMPANY LAw EXPERTISE ON ISSUES RELATED TO TAKEOVER BIDS (Jan. 10,
2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comn/internal-market/en/company/
company/news/hlgOl-2002.pdf. [hereinafter REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL
GROUP].
253. See Case C-483/99, Re Golden Shares: Commission v. French Republic,
2 C.M.L.R. 49 (2002).
254. See REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, supra note 252, at 2, 18-20.
255. Id. at 20.
256. Id. at 21. To implement this principle, there were two important pro-
posals. First, after the announcement of a takeover bid, the board of the of-
feree company should only be able to take actions frustrating the bid with the
authorization of shareholders at a general meeting. Id. at 27. Second, a bid-
der who has acquired 75% or more of risk-bearing capital should be able to
break through any mechanisms held by the target to frustrate the exercise of
control by the bidder, including golden shares carrying special control rights
held by member states. Id. at 30-3 1.
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The decision of the European Court of Justice, in Commission
v. French Republic,257 meshed well with the Report of the High
Level Group. In this case, the Court invalidated a critical de-
fense mechanism used by European companies in France and
some other states that is commonly called a "golden share."
Such a golden share gives the state the power to approve or dis-
approve any takeover. France argued that any restrictions on
the free movement of capital resulting from its golden share in
Elf-Aquitaine, a petroleum company, were justified under the
principles of necessity and proportionality, because an interrup-
tion of supplies of petroleum products could affect public secu-
rity.258 The Court disagreed, finding that the golden share was a
serious interference with the free movement of capital, went
beyond what was needed to prevent the disruption of petroleum
supplies, and was therefore in derogation of the EC Treaty.59
The decision is important because it suggests that other laws
preventing takeovers could be similarly invalidated by the
court.
The Report of the High Level Group discusses the absence of
a level playing field between the U.S. and the EU that would
have been created by the failed Thirteenth Directive or a new
directive drafted in accordance with the Report. With the adop-
tion of such a directive, European companies would be severely
restricted in putting up defenses against takeover bids, while
U.S. companies could use a number of devices to defend against
a takeover bid. 6 The Report argues that there is no level play-
ing field within the U.S. because of differing state laws, and
that the general legal and capital market environment in the
U.S. differs widely from the European environment, especially
as to transparency and the pressure to enhance shareholder
value.6 ' Further, the High Level Group suggested that, in
adopting takeover legislation, the EU should consider what type
of regulation is needed to enhance the development of efficient,
257. Case C-483/99, Re Golden Shares: Commission v. French Republic, 2
C.M.L.R. 49 (2002).
258. Id. 9191 27-30.
259. Id. 1 51.
260. REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, supra note 252, at 40.
261. Id. at 40-41.
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integrated capital markets in the EU, rather than what advan-
tages such regulation might give to U.S. companies."'2
V. THEORIES CONCERNING FEDERALISM
Not all of the overarching theories concerning the value of
federalism are relevant to financial regulation or securities
regulation in particular. For example, the enhancement of de-
mocratic values and the protection of individual liberties" are
only tangentially, if at all, related to the sometimes competing
interests of protecting investors, promoting capital formation,
and preventing systemic risk to the financial system, the latter
being the primary goals of securities regulation."' Although
federalism has strong defenders, even in the case of economic
regulation, 5 others have argued that national regulation is a
better way of reaching public policy goals. 6"
Much of the academic debate regarding the value of federal-
ism in securities regulation focuses on competition among the
states for corporate charters, rather than competition among
federal regulators or between federal and state regulators. This
literature discusses whether the competition among the states
262. Id. at 42.
263. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L.J. 1425 (1987); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States:
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); D. Bruce La
Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process - The
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577
(1985); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).
264. See SEC, Who We Are, What We Do, at http://www.sec.gov/aboutl
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2003). See also Heidi Mandanis Schoo-
ner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 468 (1986).
265. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do a
Better Job Than the States in Regulating Takeovers?, 57 Bus. LAW 1025
(2002); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securi-
ties Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). See also A.C. Pritchard, Constitu-
tional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435 (2002).
266. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1435 (1992); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on
a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903 (1994).
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in the corporate law area leads to a race to the bottom, a race to
the top or an optimal level of regulation." ' Further, much of
this discussion concerns the specific issue of defenses erected by
target companies against hostile takeovers. 68
When Congress was in the process of preempting state securi-
ties regulation in the NSMIA and the SLUSA, critics of the two
acts claimed they would diminish investor protection, whereas
their supporters argued that they would eliminate duplicative
and unnecessary regulation and therefore be efficient and effec-
tive." Much of the rhetoric in discussions about the value of
state securities regulation deals with substantive issues of what
kind of regulation is appropriate, rather than whether the SEC
should be the sole regulator in a particular area or whether
there should be dual regulation by the SEC and the states. Dis-
cussions of regulatory competition between the SEC and other
267. This debate was initiated by William Cary, Federalism and the Corpo-
rate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), arguing that
the competition for corporate charters led to a race to the bottom respecting
legal standards. For a response to the effect that such competition leads to a
race to the top see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). See also
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 1-40 (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAw 1-2 (1993).
268. For the most recent debate on these issues see Bebchuk & Ferrell, su-
pra note 223; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and
Regulatory Competition, 57 Bus. LAw 1047 (2002); Stephen J. Choi and An-
drew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L.
REV. 961 (2001); Macey, supra note 265; Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political
Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
269. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of
Securities: A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 78 WASH.
U.L.Q. 497 (2000); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Pro-
tection: Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies For Securi-
ties Fraud, 60. LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 169 (1997). See also Rutheford B.
Campbell, The Insidious Remnants of State Rules Respecting Capital Forma-
tion, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407 (2000); David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The
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federal regulators also have more to do with politics than prin-
ciple."'
Some regulatory competition can prevent an agency like the
SEC from making serious policy mistakes and give voice to in-
terest groups that are ignored by a single national agency due
to so-called "agency capture" by another interest group."' Nev-
ertheless, much state securities regulation over the years has
been duplicative, unnecessarily burdensome, and expensive for
the securities industry, without adding sufficient value in terms
of investor protection. Also, state securities regulation is un-
even from state to state and even from administration to ad-
ministration within a particular state.72 Further, regulatory
competition between national regulators frequently is an un-
seemly jurisdictional battle fueled by politics. Moreover, such
competition can lead to disrespect for the law, as one regulator
undermines the laws and regulations of another regulator.72
The theory that regulatory competition produces the most ef-
ficient regulatory structure is based on principles of economics
that fail to sufficiently take into account the psychological fac-
270. An independent commission recommended a single federal regulatory
agency for financial market regulation after the 1987 stock market crash. See
THE BRADY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET
MECHANISMS (1988). Similar recommendations were made with regard to
banking regulation during the Bush Administration. See Kenneth H. Bacon,
White House Alters Plan on Bank Laws, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1991, at A3. But
Congressional oversight committees have never been enthusiastic about such
consolidation.
271. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Signifi-
cance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50
Bus. LAw. 447, 454 (1995). See also Macey, supra note 265, at 1044-46.
272. In some states there are separate securities commissioners; in others
the securities commissioner may also be the banking and/or insurance com-
missioner. See North American Securities Administrators Association,
NASAA Member Representative List, at http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/
abtnasaa/find-regulator.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2002). The budgets of these
commissions vary widely. In New York the Martin Act was rarely enforced for
many years except to prosecute local scams. Spitzer, who is a Democrat in a
Republican administration and who may be interested in higher office, de-
cided to use the Martin Act against prominent investment banking firms. See
Editorial, New York's Bubble Boys, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at A26; Edito-
rial, Spitzer's Telecom Meltdown, WALL ST. J., April 29, 2002, at A18.
273. See Coffee, supra note 271, at 473 (1995). See also Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Am. Bankers Ass'n. v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
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tors affecting investor confidence. Although the primary goal of
securities regulation is frequently articulated as investor pro-
tection, this understanding is too simplistic. Capital formation
is at the heart of the capitalist system. The reason securities
regulation became a matter of federal concern is that there was
a need to increase investor confidence in order to generate capi-
tal formation in the 1930s. There was also a need to assure
against systemic collapses caused by excessive stock market
speculation leading to the bursting of the stock market bubble
in 1929 and the bankruptcy of numerous financial institutions.
State securities regulation and SRO regulation had proved in-
adequate in performing this task, which was national in scope.
A similar crisis of investor confidence exists today due to the
bursting of the technology stock market bubble and the corpo-
rate financial scandals of Enron Corp., Worldcom, and other
companies.274 The SEC reacted to this crisis by prosecuting
wrongdoers and proposing new regulations on a number of
fronts, ranging from a new regulatory system for the accounting
profession, certifications of financial statements by CEOs, to
certain restrictions on research analysts.75 Congress then at-
tempted to address this crisis by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.27 The NASAA and the New York Attorney General tried to
address these problems by investigating and prosecuting
Merrill Lynch and other securities firms. 7
274. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, Financial Fraud and the New Face of Se-
curities Regulation - Part I, 24 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (West) 65 (July
2002); Albert A. DeStephano, Lecture On Corporate Securities & Financial
Law: Panel Discussion: Enron: What Went Wrong?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 1 (2002).
275. See Enactment of Broad Accounting, Corporate Governance Reform Act
Brings New Prohibitions, Requirements for Executives and Auditors, 34 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1281, 1290-95 (Aug. 5, 2002). See also Michael Schroe-
der, Deals & Dealmakers: SEC Proposes Rules to Improve Disclosure by Public
Companies, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2002, at C5; Paul Beckett, SEC Order Forces
Executives To Swear by Their Numbers, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at Al; Mi-
chael Schroeder, Audit-Rules Overhaul Is Proposed in Senate, WALL ST. J.,
May 9, 2002, at Cll.
276. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See also Greg Hitt,
Bush Signs Sweeping Legislation Aimed at Curbing Corporate Fraud, WALL
ST. J., July 31, 2002, at A4.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 147-53.
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The issue addressed by this Article is whether problems of
this magnitude should be solved by a national regulator, the
SEC, or a dual regulatory system of the SEC and state regula-
tors. Since the problems are national, and in some respects in-
ternational in scope, an effective national regulator seems more
appropriate than piecemeal state regulation. On the other
hand, aggressive state action, such as the New York Attorney
General's action against Merrill Lynch, can highlight gaps and
problems with the federal regulatory scheme. But now that
Congress has dealt with this issue and ordered the SEC and
SROs to find regulatory solutions, should state regulation be
permitted to continue? Continued state regulation might prove
costly and may lead to conflicting regulations; if so, the benefits
to investors will be problematic. Hopefully, the SEC, the SROs,
and the state regulators will cooperate to produce a uniform
national standard for dealing with analysts' conflicts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The allocation of regulatory responsibilities between federal
and state securities regulators has not always been logical or
even coherent, because it is affected by politics and economic
history. Even as this Article was being written, the traditional
lines between federal and state responsibility for overseeing the
conduct of public corporations was being changed in the U.S. by
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which federalized the
law governing corporate audit committees and yet left imple-
mentation of this legislation to SROs as well as to the SEC.278
Similarly, implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan
was limiting the ability of member state regulators to maintain
national standards in the face of further harmonization of EU
law.279 Yet, in the wake of the financial fraud scandals roiling
the stock markets in the U.S. and Europe, both federal and
state securities regulators were endeavoring to assert their ju-
risdiction over wrongdoers. In short, the subject of this Article
is current and fluid.
Although some long-term principles would appear to animate
legislators in their reactions to financial crisis, fixing an imme-
278. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.
279. See United Kingdom Moves to Protect EC-Threatened Stock Listing
Regime, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1309-10 (Aug. 5, 2002).
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diate problem often compromises such principles. As a general
matter, in the U.S. regulation of financial institutions and
products has been given to federal regulators and the rules per-
taining to corporate governance have been left to the states.
Investor protection historically has been a matter of dual fed-
eral and state regulation. Yet, when Congress believed that
duplicative regulation and strike suits were impairing capital
formation, it enacted the NSMIA and then the SLUSA, imping-
ing upon both state securities and common laws.28 When Con-
gress believed that corporate law was not adequately protecting
investors from fraud, it impinged upon state corporate law
through the Williams Act and then the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 8'
In Europe, there has been an overriding concern with the
need for economic integration and recognition that uniform fi-
nancial regulation can be a barrier to competition. Yet, despite
the importance of the single passport, host countries have thus
far been able to impose customer protection principles upon fi-
nancial institutions from other countries." Further, the princi-
ple of subsidiarity has been utilized as a brake upon harmoniza-
tion and integration. Impatience with the progress of financial
market integration and a fear that the European capital mar-
kets were not sufficiently competitive with U.S. capital markets
led to the Financial Services Action Plan and the Lamfalussy
Report - initiatives that evidenced regulatory competition on
an international level."3
As securities markets have become national and even inter-
national and significantly affect the national economic welfare
in the U.S. and the EU-wide markets in Europe, there has been
a trend toward federalizing securities regulation. This trend
probably will continue. Yet, when local investors and constitu-
ents are implicated, state regulators become active.84 Only
when dual regulation becomes unnecessarily costly or at odds
with federal regulation, is it likely to be supplanted by federal
regulation.
280. See supra notes 64-65.
281. See supra note 167.
282. See Gerard Hertig, Imperfect Mutual Recognition for EC Financial
Services, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 177, 181 (1994).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 188-199. See also Amir N. Licht,
Regulatory Arbitrage for Real, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563 (1998).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 147-56.
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The availability of the Supremacy Clause under the U.S.
Constitution appears to provide a mechanism for dealing with
policy conflicts between federal and state law that is not avail-
able in Europe. The European Court of Justice has neverthe-
less managed to invalidate national law that is contrary to the
principles of the TEU.285 In both the U.S. and Europe, the po-
litical process whereby securities regulation is allocated be-
tween federal (or EU) and state authorities is extremely com-
plex and time consuming. This means that regulatory change
generally is incremental. Further, interest group pressure is a
factor not only with regard to the substance of regulation but
also whether regulation is imposed by federal, state, or SRO
administrators.
U.S. constitutional law and the TEU provide theoretical
frameworks for reconciling federal and state interests in securi-
ties regulation. Developments in the securities markets, includ-
ing corporate scandals, financial failures, and political compro-
mises explain how such theory is applied, sometimes logically
but often haphazardly. Although investor protection should be
the guiding principle for allocating regulatory responsibility, so
many complex factors go into promoting investor confidence
that it is difficult to determine whether the SEC (or an organ of
the EU) or state regulators should necessarily be the guardians
of investors. Prevention of systemic risk, for example, gives
federal securities regulators some responsibility for maintain-
ing the long-term financial health of the securities industry.
Further, promotion of capital formation is a federal goal that
underlies investor protection. Concern about the viability of
pension plans is another growing policy consideration in balanc-
ing the interests of investors against those of business. State
regulators tend to view investors more as consumers than as
capitalists, but on the other hand have an interest in encourag-
ing businesses to incorporate and do business within their ju-
risdictions. These classic tensions between finance and indus-
try frequently translate into constitutional law tensions.
Regulatory competition exists between federal and state
agencies and courts, as well as between federal financial regula-
tors, and between regulators in different countries. This com-
petition frequently is fomented by affected business interests,
285. See supra note 177.
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but can be reconciled through coordination and cooperation. In
order for competing regulatory interests to be reconciled, how-
ever, regulators must have the same vision of which investor
interests require protection and how that protection should be
achieved.

